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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE 









It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of 
the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions 
within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of 
Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of 
external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the 
jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the 
UK’s apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme 
Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial 
Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional 
interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly 
faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but 
reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK’s apex court has 
                                                          
* My thanks are due to Lizzy O’Loughlin and Se-shauna Wheatle for their comments and suggestions in relation 
to a previous draft. I am also grateful to Paul Scott, and the participants at the ‘Constitutional Legacies of Empire’ 
workshop, for insightful discussions on the issues addressed in this piece.  
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incrementally begun to articulate a species of ‘autochthonous constitutionalism’ while 
simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test. 
 
Keywords: Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; Supreme Court; Constitutional Law; 
Constitutional Borrowing; Constitutional Interpretation; Proportionality. 
 
Introduction 
Debates regarding the extent to which the UK’s component jurisdictions are receptive to public 
law influences from elsewhere have in recent years coalesced around examination of the 
domestic impact of European Union laws and decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The ‘incoming tide’1 of continental European influences has tended to dominate both 
academic and judicial discussions of ‘external’ influences on ‘internal’ legal standards. The 
relationships between the domestic and the international governed – on the domestic plane – 
primarily by the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and (until its repeal in 2020) European 
Communities Act 1972 created umbilical connections between domestic and pan-European 
laws.2 These linkages were amplified in practice by the EU doctrine of direct effect and the ‘de 
facto supremacy over domestic law’3 achieved by ECHR norms. In consequence, discussions 
                                                          
1 H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] Ch. 401, 418 (Denning MR).  
2 For discussion of these connections see: J.E.K. Murkens, ‘The UK’s Reluctant Relationship with the EU: 
Integration, Equivocation, or Disintegration?’ and R. Masterman, ‘Federal Dynamics of the UK/Strasbourg 
Relationship’ in R. Schütze and S. Tierney, The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2018). 
3 S. Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 749, 760.  
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relating to the receptivity of the UK legal order to constitutional ideas from elsewhere have, of 
late, been dominated by the domestic effect of pan-European standards.   
The influence of non-EU/ECHR external norms in the UK has not, however, been 
entirely neglected as a topic of academic inquiry; the extent to which common law systems 
share constitutional characteristics4 and the interplay between jurisprudential influences in 
human rights decision-making5 both provide recurring themes to the literature concerning the 
extra-jurisdictional influences on the UK’s legal order(s). However, amidst broader narratives 
surrounding the exchange and migration of constitutional ideas,6 comparatively little attention 
has been given to the importation of influences from the almost exclusively overseas 
jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). The neglect of detailed 
consideration of the relationship between the external and internal roles played by the Law 
                                                          
4 For instance: J.W. Harris, ‘The Privy Council and the Common Law’ (1990) 106 LQR 574; M. Elliott, J.N.E. 
Varuhas and S. Wilson Stark (eds), The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).  
5 See for instance: M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997); C. 
McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ 
(2000) 20 OJLS 499; I. Cram, ‘Resort to Foreign Constitutional Norms in Domestic Human Rights Jurisprudence 
with reference to Terrorism Cases’ (2009) 68 CLJ 118; H. Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of 
Foreign Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).  
6 For an introduction to a now vast literature on the migration and transplantation of constitutional ideas as general 
patterns see: G. Halmai, ‘Constitutional Transplants’ in R. Masterman and R. Schütze (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); V. Perju, 
‘Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and Migrations’ in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó, The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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Lords/Justices of the UK Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication is slightly puzzling.7 
This is for the reason that the suitability of the UK’s most senior judges to adjudicate on 
domestic constitutional8 issues – in their parallel capacity as members of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court – has been supported by reference 
to the (prior and ongoing) experiences of the JCPC in the determination of constitutional issues 
arising from its overseas jurisdiction. While the precise nature of the nexus between the two 
courts is often imprecisely defined, the potential to harness the constitutional experiences of 
the JCPC for domestic deployment has been a recurring feature of suggestions for reform of 
the UK’s apex court,9 was influential on the allocation – initially to the JCPC itself – of 
jurisdiction to determine ‘devolution issues’ from 1999 until 2009,10 and continues to be 
judicially-noted in support of the burgeoning constitutional functions of the UK Supreme 
                                                          
7 For a partial exception see: C. Harlow, ‘Export, import. The ebb and flow of English Public Law’ [2000] PL 
240.  
8 Primarily, for the purposes of this essay, in adjudication pursuant to the HRA 1998 and devolution statutes. 
9 In the early 1970s, Louis Blom-Cooper and Gavin Drewry had suggested – as arguments in favour of a UK Bill 
of Rights (and perhaps even written constitution) began to gather momentum – that, ‘[t]he experience of their 
Lordships in handling constitutional problems of the Commonwealth may yet provide them with a significant 
insight into such problems nearer to home’ (L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House 
of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.105). 
10 As noted by, for instance: Robert Reed QC, ‘Devolution and the Judiciary’ in Cambridge Centre for Public 
Law, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 
p.25; A. Le Sueur, ‘What is the Future for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? (London: Constitution 
Unit, 2001), pp.11-14; S. Shetreet and S. Turenne, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the 
English Judiciary (2nd ed) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.44-45; C. McCorkindale, A. 
McHarg and P. Scott, ‘The Courts, Devolution and Constitutional Review’ (2018) 36 University of Queensland 
Law Review 289.  
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Court.11 In the light of this, the interrelationship between decisions of the JCPC and the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords/Supreme Court in the sphere of constitutional 
adjudication is worthy of more detailed consideration.12   
This piece considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the 
UK’s legal system(s) before testing the claim that the UK apex court’s ability to determine 
constitutional issues is somehow enriched by the experiences of the JCPC. The latter point is 
considered via an assessment of the extent to which the jurisprudence of the JCPC has exerted 
an influence on constitutional decision-making in the UK’s apex court. First, it will be argued 
that while ad hoc citation of Judicial Committee decisions in judgments of the House of 
Lords/Supreme Court is a common occurrence, there is little evidence of a sustained pattern of 
reliance on JCPC authorities in the context of domestic constitutional adjudication. Second, 
evidence of a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority in two fields 
– (i) relating to the adoption of a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional 
interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – will be 
examined. Both areas will be argued to be illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial 
Committee authority, but revealing of divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the 
UK’s apex court has incrementally begun to articulate a species of ‘autochthonous 
                                                          
11 Baroness Hale, ‘Devolution and the Supreme Court – 20 Years On’ (Speech to the Scottish Public Law Group, 
14 June 2018). 
12 For a general introduction see: K. Keith, ‘The Interplay with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’ in L. 
Blom-Cooper, B. Dickson and G. Drewry, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876-2009 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).    
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constitutionalism’13 while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the 
proportionality test.  
  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the UK Apex Court 
The Judicial Committee was formally established by the Judicial Committee Act 1833 and in 
its pomp was estimated to serve as final appellate tribunal to a quarter of the world’s 
population.14 Through serving to uphold the ‘supremacy of imperial statute’15 to its primary 
latter day role as interpreter of the written constitutions of various Caribbean states, its 
jurisdiction has been marked by a close engagement with constitutional issues.16 As a result of 
this constitutional jurisdiction – coupled with its innovative (but little used) reference 
procedure17 – the Judicial Committee has been described as an ‘embryonic … constitutional 
court.’18 Its extensive multi-state jurisdiction also served as a template of sorts for the model 
                                                          
13 S. Stephenson, ‘The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in autochthonous constitutionalism’ [2015] PL 394. 
14 P. O’Connor, The Constitutional Role of the Privy Council and Prerogative (London: Justice, 2009), p.16.  
15 D. B Swinfen, Imperial Appeal: The Debate on the Appeal to the Privy Council, 1833-1986 (Manchester 
University Press, 1987), p.15.  
16 L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), p.104.  
17 Judicial Committee Act 1833, s.4 (and, for instance, In the matter of the Baronetcy of Pringle of Stichill [2016] 
UKPC 16). 
18 P. O’Connor, The Constitutional Role of the Privy Council and Prerogative (London: Justice, 2009), p.17.  
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of supranational adjudication that came to be seen as one of the late-twentieth century 
hallmarks of constitutionalisation.19  
However, since at least20 the Statute of Westminster 1931, the jurisdiction of the JCPC 
has been steadily receding.21 Appeals from Canada and India were ended in 1949, with 
Australia, Hong Kong and New Zealand following in 1986, 1997 and 2003 respectively. In 
addition to a residual specialist domestic jurisdiction,22 the Judicial Committee continues to 
hear appeals from Crown Dependencies23 and Overseas Territories,24 as well as from a number 
of Commonwealth – mostly Caribbean – states.25 In spite of its diminished geographical 
jurisdiction, the Judicial Committee maintains a not insignificant case-load, handing down 
decisions in some 40 appeals in 2018, and 53 appeals in 2019.26  
                                                          
19 See N. Bentwich, ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a Model of an International Court for Human 
Rights’ (1948) 2 ILQ 392; T. Robinson and A. Bulkan, ‘Constitutional Comparisons by a Supranational Court in 
Flux: The Privy Council and Caribbean Bills of Rights’ (2017) 80 MLR 379.  
20 Viscount Haldane described the Judicial Committee, in 1922, as a ‘disappearing body’ (Viscount Haldane of 
Cloan, ‘The Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’ (1922) 1 CLJ 143, 154).  
21 On which see: D.B. Swinfen, Imperial Appeal: The Debate on the Appeal to the Privy Council, 1833-1986 
(Manchester University Press, 1987).  
22 In relation to, for instance, appeals from the disciplinary committee of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons 
(s.17(1) Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966); disputes arising under the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 
(s.7); appeals from Prize Courts; appeals from the High Court of Chivalry.  
23 Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man.  
24 Including, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and the Turks and Caicos Islands.  
25 Including, the Bahamas, Grenada and Jamaica.  
26 At the turn of the 21st century the JCPC heard approximately 70 cases per year (A. Le Sueur, What is the future 
for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? (London: Constitution Unit, 2001), p.4).  
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The JCPC is at once internal and external to the UK’s constitutional order; its benches 
are populated almost exclusively by Justices of the UK Supreme Court, but the larger part of 
its diet of cases originate overseas. Though it sits – predominantly27 – in London, ‘… the JCPC 
is not a court of any part of the United Kingdom’28 and in common with the decisions of other 
foreign courts, decisions of the JCPC are regarded in the context of adjudication in the House 
of Lords/Supreme Court as being strongly persuasive, though not binding. In practice the 
domestic influence of JCPC decisions has been an area of niche, or only occasional,29 concern 
to researchers.30 But the general relationship between decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
Judicial Committee has recently been restated in Willers v Joyce:  
 
First, given that the JCPC is not a UK court at all, decisions of the JCPC cannot be 
binding on any judge of England and Wales, and, in particular, cannot override any 
                                                          
27 The Judicial Committee has occasionally convened overseas, including in the Bahamas and Mauritius. For an 
assessment of the JCPC’s efforts to address its remoteness from much of its jurisdiction see: P. Mitchell, ‘The 
Privy Council and the Difficulty of Distance’ (2016) 36 OJLS 26.  
28 Willers v Joyce (2) [2016] UKSC 44, [10]. See also: Alexander E Hull and Co v McKenna [1926] IR 402, 403-
404.  
29 For instance in relation to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Attorney General for Jersey v Holley 
[2005] UKPC 23; [2005] 2 AC 580) ‘overruling’ the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (R v Smith 
(Morgan James) [2001] 1 AC 146) on an appeal relating to the law of provocation. The Judicial Committee 
decision was subsequently adopted as authoritative in R v James [2006] EWCA Crim 14; [2006] 1 All ER 759. 
On which see: J. Elvin, ‘The Doctrine of Precedent and the Provocation Defence: a Comment on R v James’ 
(2006) 69 MLR 819.  
30 Tyrrell’s excellent recent study – H. Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of Foreign 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) – excludes Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decisions 
from its dataset (p.21).   
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decision of a court of England and Wales (let alone a decision of the Supreme Court or 
the Law Lords) which would otherwise represent a precedent which was binding on 
that judge. Secondly, given the identity of the Privy Counsellors who sit on the JCPC 
and the fact that they apply the common law, any decision of the JCPC, at least on a 
common law issue, should, subject always to the first point, normally be regarded by 
any Judge of England and Wales, and indeed any Justice of the Supreme Court, as being 
of great weight and persuasive value. Thirdly, the JCPC should regard itself as bound 
by any decision of the House of Lords or the Supreme Court – at least when applying 
the law of England and Wales. That last qualification is important: in some JCPC 
jurisdictions, the applicable common law is that of England and Wales, whereas in other 
JCPC jurisdictions, the common law is local common law, which will often be, but is 
by no means always necessarily, identical to that of England and Wales.31 
 
The Judicial Committee is staffed – overwhelmingly so in practice32 – by the judges of the 
UK’s domestic apex court. Since 2009, the JCPC has also been physically accommodated 
                                                          
31 Willers v Joyce (2) [2016] UKSC 44, [12]. The specific element of the judgment concerned the circumstances 
in which the JCPC might ‘not only decide that [an] earlier decision of the House of Lords or Supreme Court, or 
of the Court of Appeal, was wrong, but also can expressly direct that domestic courts should treat the decision of 
the JCPC as representing the law of England and Wales’ [19]. On the latter point see: P. Mirfield, ‘A Novel Theory 
of Privy Council Precedent’ (2017) 133 LQR 1.  
32 Willers v Joyce (2) [2016] UKSC 44, [11]: ‘… either all or four of the five Privy Counsellors who normally sit 
on any appeal will almost always be Justices of the Supreme Court. This reflects the position as it has been for 
more than 100 years, following the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which created the Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary (ie the Law Lords), who thereafter constituted the majority of the Privy Counsellors who sat in the JCPC, 
until the creation of the Supreme Court in October 2009.’  
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within the same premises as the UK Supreme Court.33 This proximity bears upon the 
relationship between the two courts in a number of ways. The workload implications of apex 
court judges populating panels in the Judicial Committee are occasionally commented upon.34 
But the overlapping membership of the two courts also diminishes the external element of the 
Judicial Committee’s influence. As Bell has suggested, the common membership of the two 
Courts has led to a perception that JCPC decisions are treated in the Supreme Court ‘like obiter 
dicta in an English case, rather than the interpretation of a foreign law.’35 Additionally, the 
importation of external influences originating in Judicial Committee decisions themselves 
taken by Law Lords/Justices of the Supreme Court represents a relatively surreptitious form of 
jurisprudential migration, less likely to attract controversy than the importation of authorities 
originating in an overseas court populated by a majority of overseas judges.36 
 
The Claimed Benefit to Constitutional Adjudication in the UK Apex Court 
The 1998 devolution legislation positioned the JCPC as the legal arbiter of devolution disputes. 
In part, this decision was the result of a perceived deficiency of the UK’s then apex court; the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords – by virtue of its position as a component of the 
                                                          
33 Prior to 2009, the Judicial Committee sat in the Council Chamber at No.9 Downing Street.  
34 B. Dickson, ‘The Lords of Appeal and their Work, 1967-1996’ in P. Carmichael and B. Dickson, The House of 
Lords: Its Parliamentary and Judicial Roles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), pp.150-153; A. Le Sueur, What is 
the future for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? (London: Constitution Unit, 2001), pp.11-14; M. Peel 
and J. Croft, ‘Privy Council Hampers Supreme Court’, Financial Times, 20 September 2009. 
35 J. Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court, 2010-11’ (2012) 1(2) Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 20, 23 (commenting on the use in R v Chaytor of two JCPC decisions from Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand). 
36 A point inelegantly made by Lord Hoffmann in, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) 125 LQR 416. 
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UK legislature – was felt to be an inapt mediator of disputes concerning the legislative 
relationships between the devolved bodies and Westminster.37 (This institutional obstacle to 
devolution cases being heard by the UK’s apex court was removed, in 2009, by the replacement 
of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords with the UK Supreme Court.38) However, 
characteristics of the Judicial Committee were argued to weigh in favour of it functioning as a 
proto-constitutional court in relation to devolution disputes. The allocation to the JCPC of this 
new adjudicatory power was at least partially justified by reference to the Judicial Committee’s 
existing (and prior) jurisdiction in relation to constitutional matters. In 1998 the Labour 
government supported the allocation of the devolution jurisdiction to the JCPC in the following 
terms:  
 
The Judicial Committee acts now as the final constitutional court of appeal for various 
Commonwealth dependencies and colonies (sic) … As it already has that role, we 
thought it appropriate to use its experience of handling cases that raise constitutional 
issues.39 
  
Others were in agreement; Lord Selkirk, for instance, noted during the House of Lords debates 
on the Scotland Bill that the Judicial Committee’s ‘wealth of constitutional experience’40 
                                                          
37 A. Le Sueur, What is the Future for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? (London: Constitution Unit, 
2001), p.11 
38 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.40 and sch.9.  
39 Hansard, HC Debs, Vol.305, Col.927 (3rd February 1998), Win Griffiths MP (Parliamentary Under Secretary 
in the Welsh Office).  
40 Hansard, HL Debs, Vol.593, Cols.1964-1965 (28th October 1998) (Lord Selkirk of Douglas).  
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rendered it an appropriate arbiter of competence disputes arising under the (then proposed) 
devolution legislation. 
Judges have also endorsed the positive benefits that might derive from drawing 
domestically on the constitutional experiences of the Judicial Committee. Lord Reed (as he is 
now) wrote in 1998 that the decision to allocate the newly-formed devolution jurisdiction to 
the JCPC was ‘readily understandable’ on the basis of its ‘already developed experience of 
constitutional issues referred to it from the courts of several Commonwealth countries.’41 In 
2018, Lady Hale stated – in the context of a discussion of how the devolution jurisdiction has 
transformed the UK Supreme Court into something approximate to a ‘genuinely constitutional 
court’ – that ‘[a]s members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, we were familiar 
with this role in the context of the Commonwealth Constitutions with which we have to deal.’42  
However, as these judicial endorsements illustrate, the specific nature of the benefit to 
be derived from the linkage to the JCPC is unclear. Both Lord Reed and Lady Hale suggest the 
positive advantage of drawing on the body of constitutional authority developed over time by 
the Judicial Committee. Lady Hale – using the present tense – additionally highlights the direct 
experiential benefit resulting from Justices of the Supreme Court sitting as members of the 
JCPC. Either way, the sense is given that the linkage between the two courts and their two 
jurisdictions – the external (or international) and the internal (or domestic) – somehow 
positively impacts upon decision-making in the UK top court.    
                                                          
41 Robert Reed QC, ‘Devolution and the Judiciary’ in Cambridge Centre for Public Law, Constitutional Reform 
in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p.25. 
42 Baroness Hale, ‘Devolution and the Supreme Court – 20 Years On’ (Speech to the Scottish Public Law Group, 
14 June 2018). 
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There is a basically sound logic underpinning this suggested connection between the 
Law Lords’/Supreme Court Justices’ external and internal roles. Indeed, the judges’ 
contemporaneous membership of both courts may well provide insights into the context and 
intricacies of JCPC appeals that they could not claim in relation to domestic deployment of 
other external authorities. But, as Ewing has argued,43 claims that the external experiences 
and/or case-law of the Privy Council can straightforwardly be transposed into the domestic 
constitution simultaneously have something of an air of unreality to them. If the claimed benefit 
is to be found in the ability of the Law Lords/Justices of the Supreme Court to draw upon the 
accumulated constitutional jurisprudence built up by the JCPC, then it is unclear what – beyond 
the shared memberships of the two courts – would privilege the position of Judicial Committee 
case-law vis-à-vis the jurisprudence of (say) other top courts in the common law world. If the 
benefit lies in the judges’ participation in the adjudication of overseas constitutional cases in 
the JCPC, then the contemporary experiential benefits to be obtained should be understood as 
reflecting the JCPC’s diminished and (comparatively) narrow contemporary jurisdiction. 
Indeed, commentators observed, at the point at which competence questions arising under the 
devolution legislation were allocated to the JCPC, that ‘the Judicial Committee had not 
adjudicated on “division of powers” questions between different parts of a federation since 
Canada stopped sending appeals in 1949’44 and that the broader constitutional jurisdiction of 
                                                          
43 Cf. K.D. Ewing, ‘A Bill of Rights: Lessons from the Privy Council’ in W. Finnie, C. Himsworth, and N. Walker, 
Edinburgh Essays in Public Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p.231: ‘… there is a superficial 
attraction in the simplistic assumption that with this experience the English courts must be well equipped to deal 
with a Bill of Rights which would flourish under the guidance of English judges.’  
44 A. Le Sueur, What is the Future for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? (London: Constitution Unit, 
2001), p.11.  
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the Court had declined so much as to be negligible.45 And if the claimed benefit is to be found 
in the contemporaneous membership of the two courts then it is likely to give rise to linkages 
which will be imperceptible through the lens of decided cases. In the absence of access to the 
judges themselves the extent to which the judges’ experiences as members of the JCPC 
anecdotally inform their approach to decision-making in the UK’s apex court will remain 
largely invisible.46 Though, even in the context of research drawing on interviews with the 
Supreme Court Justices, Tyrrell notes the ‘unseen’ role played by reference to foreign laws in 
domestic adjudication.47 For these reasons, the remainder of this piece focuses on the visible 
aspect of the relationship between the two courts: the extent to which JCPC decisions exercise 
discernible influence on constitutional decision-making in the UK’s apex court.  
 
Incidental References to Judicial Committee Decisions in the UK Apex Court 
By contrast with those areas of the law in which statute has mandated consideration of external 
authorities, UK apex court judges are not obligated to consider JCPC decisions. Incidental 
                                                          
45 R. Hazell, ‘Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State Survive?’ CIPFA/Times Lecture, 4 November 1998.  
46 The ‘sociological’ dimensions of the Law Lords’ and Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making processes are 
illuminated in Alan Patterson’s works The Law Lords (London: Macmillan, 1982) and Final Judgment: The Last 
Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Oxford: Hart, 2013). The interplay between the roles of the Law Lords in the 
Appellate and Judicial Committees is touched upon in Paterson’s earlier work, The Law Lords, but his coverage 
focused on the interplay between the judges themselves rather than between the courts they populate. While 
Patterson’s later work – Final Judgment – also considers broader ‘dialogues’ between the Supreme Court and its 
counsel, other courts, and government, this particular dialogue – the dialogue between the two courts served by 
the Justices of the Supreme Court – is not considered.  
47 H. Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of Foreign Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2018), p.196. 
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citation of Judicial Committee decisions in House of Lords/Supreme Court judgments raising 
constitutional questions is nonetheless commonplace.   
External influences are occasionally visible in UK apex court cases concerning 
constitutional principles, where JCPC decisions have provided contextual information or have 
otherwise infiltrated decisions concerning the domestic variants of those principles.48 In 
Jackson v Attorney-General,49 Lord Steyn spent some time considering the JCPC’s case law 
on the legal limitations which might operate in respect of legislatures, citing Attorney-General 
of New South Wales v Trethowan,50 Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe,51 and a number of 
cases from South Africa in order to animate his discussion of Parliament as including both 
‘static and dynamic’ elements.52 Lord Steyn also punctuated his speech in Anderson with 
reference to those ‘House and Lords and Privy Council’53 decisions emphasising that the ‘the 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches of 
                                                          
48 In relation to, for instance, the doctrine of separation of powers (Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 (cited in eg 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407, 526)); dualism (Secretary of 
State in Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) 13 Moo PC 22 and Higgs v Minister of National 
Security [2000] 2 AC 228 (cited in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5, [33] and [167]); and the parameters of statutory interpretation by judges (Union Colliery Co. of British 
Columbia Ltd v Bryden [1899] AC 580 (cited in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557)). 
49 Jackson v Attorney-General [2006] UKHL 56.  
50 Attorney-General of New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526. 
51 Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172.  
52 Jackson v Attorney-General [2006] UKHL 56, [81].  
53 The latter being: Attorney General for Australia v The Queen [1957] AC 288, 315; Liyanage v The Queen 
[1967] 1 AC 259, 291; Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195. 
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government is a strong principle of our system of government.’54 In Bancoult (No.2)55 various 
Law Lords engaged with the JCPC authorities relating to the power to legislate for the ‘peace, 
order and good government’ of a territory.56 And more recently, in the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous Miller/Cherry decision, the Privy Council decision in Bobb v Manning57 was cited 
in order to illustrate that the concept of governmental accountability to Parliament lay at the 
‘heart of Westminster democracy’.58  
The House of Lords/Supreme Court has also utilised JCPC decisions in order to 
evidence more specific points of law. In R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department59 – a case concerning the proposed extradition of the claimant to the United States 
in order to stand trial for various offences, including murder in the first degree (which was 
punishable either by a death sentence, or life imprisonment) – the House of Lords relied upon 
the JCPC decision in Reyes v The Queen60 in order to illustrate that a mandatory death sentence 
should be regarded as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ (and as such, a violation of Article 
3 ECHR).61 In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,62 a number of 
                                                          
54 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 AC 837, [39]. 
55 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 51; [2009] 1 AC 453, 
[50], [99], [125].   
56 Including: Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] AC 900; Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259.  
57 Bobb v Manning [2006] UKPC 22, [13]. 
58 R (on the application of Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, 
[46].  
59 R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72; [2009] 1 AC 335.  
60 Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235.  
61 R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72; [2009] 1 AC 335, [63].  
62 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.  
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Judicial Committee decisions were cited in support of the Court’s majority judgment: these 
included The Zamora63 (in support of the proposition that ‘the exercise of [the Crown’s 
administrative] powers must be compatible with legislation and the common law’64); and 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke65 (in support of the notion that the courts will not directly 
enforce political/constitutional conventions).66 
It is reasonably clear that House of Lords/Supreme Court citation of Judicial Committee 
decisions is both relatively common, and relatively ad hoc. While routine and often rigorous 
engagement with ECHR and EU authorities is characteristic of adjudication under the HRA 
and ECA, the citation of JCPC authorities in constitutional cases is rather more intermittent. A 
number of significant post-1998 constitutional cases decided by the House of Lords/Supreme 
Court include no reference to overseas decisions of the JCPC:67 AXA v HM Advocate;68 HS2;69 
R (Evans) v Attorney-General and R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor70 can be counted within this 
category. In one sense this is unsurprising, for the reason that the primary focus of the decisions 
could be argued to be the interpretation and implications of UK statute law. But each of the 
above cases also arguably deals with matters of broader constitutional principle; in particular 
AXA addresses the sort of ‘federal’ dispute which provided the initial justification for allocating 
                                                          
63 The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77. 
64 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [45]. 
65 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645 
66 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [144].  
67 Although pre-2009 JCPC decisions on devolution do feature (eg Anderson v Scottish Ministers [2001] UKPC 
D5; [2003] 2 AC 602 is cited in AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868).  
68 AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868.  
69 R (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 324. 
70 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.  
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devolutionary competence disputes to the JCPC, while in Evans the lead judgment is explicit 
in its efforts to realise the rule of law as a principle which reaches beyond the municipal.71 As 
a result, the sense is given of an absence of methodical citation of Judicial Committee 
jurisprudence on constitutional issues, and of a relatively sporadic approach even in those fields 
where comparisons might be drawn (which itself in turn – and as the above examples from 
Lord Steyn may illustrate – might be judge-dependent72).  
  
Patterns of Diminishing Influence?  
Limited evidence is however available of recurrent references to certain JCPC cases – or lines 
of JCPC authority – demonstrating an initial post-1998 influence on domestic judicial 
reasoning, giving way to a diminishing effect over time. This pattern can be observed in two 
fields in particular: the UK apex court’s approach to the interpretation of constitutional 
measures and its approach to the parameters of the test for proportionality.  
 
‘Generous and purposive’ interpretation: 
(a) Interpreting Rights Instruments: 
Following the full implementation of the Human Rights Act in October 2000 a number of 
House of Lords decisions drew parallels with the experiences of the JCPC in interpreting 
constitutional bills of rights, suggesting that the HRA 1998 ought to be afforded a ‘generous 
                                                          
71 R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [51].  
72 H. Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of Foreign Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2018), pp.195-198.  
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and purposive’73 interpretation in order that individuals fully benefit from its protections.74 In 
R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline, Lord Hope said: 
 
In Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut75 … Lord Woolf referred to the 
general approach to the interpretations of constitutions and bills of rights indicated in 
previous decisions of the Board, which he said were equally applicable to the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991. He mentioned Lord Wilberforce’s observation in 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher76 … that instruments of this nature call for a generous 
interpretation suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms referred to, and Lord Diplock’s comment in Attorney General of The 
Gambia v Momodou Jobe77 … that a generous and purposive construction is to be given 
to that part of a constitution which protects and entrenches fundamental rights and 
freedoms to which all persons in the state are to be entitled. The same approach will 
now have to be applied in this country when issues are raised under the 1998 Act about 
the compatibility of domestic legislation and of acts of public authorities with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms which are enshrined in the Convention.78 
 
                                                          
73 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 329 (Lord Wilberforce). See also: R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, 375; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 703.  
74 Lord Steyn, ‘The New Legal Landscape’ [2000] EHRLR 549, 550.  
75 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951, 966. 
76 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328. 
77 Attorney General of The Gambia v Momodou Jobe [1984] AC 689, 700. 
78 R. v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex p. Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326 (emphasis added). 
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The so-called ‘radical’ approach to interpretation79 – initially evidenced in R v A (No.2) – drew 
on this expansive understanding of the Act, conceiving of the courts’ powers under s.3(1) HRA 
as potentially remedial of all inconsistencies other than those explicitly ‘stated in terms’ by 
statute. This approach in turn viewed the declaration of incompatibility as a ‘measure of last 
resort’ to be avoided ‘unless … plainly impossible to do so.’80  
While the radical approach to interpretation under s.3(1) HRA was contextualised by 
the Privy Council experiences of the Law Lords,81 and by reference to the ‘weaker’82 provisions 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it nonetheless sat uneasily with the constitutional 
‘balance’83 that the adoption of the Human Rights Act’s specific model had sought to preserve. 
Maximisation of the freedoms protected via the HRA through such judicially-focused (and 
directed) means minimised the co-operative elements of the Act in a way which did not find 
wholesale support within the senior judiciary.84 As Lord Rodger cautioned:  
 
                                                          
79 A. Kavanagh, ‘Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The “Radical” Approach to s.3(1) Revisited’ [2005] EHRLR 
259. 
80 R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [44] (Lord Steyn).  
81 R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [38], [44] (Lord Steyn). 
82 R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [44] (Lord Steyn). 
83 Lord Irvine of Lairg QC, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act: Parliament, the Courts and the Executive’ 
[2003] PL 308. 
84 See for instance: R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [108] (Lord Hope); R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 AC 837, [30] (Lord Bingham).  
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… the Privy Council decisions may not provide a sure guide to the approach to be 
adopted under section 3(1). They are concerned with constitutions that are the supreme 
law, with which other laws must conform on pain of invalidity.85 
 
The expansive view to s.3(1) therefore relatively quickly ceded ground to a more contextual 
approach under which the dividing line between interpretation and law-making will be 
contingent on a range issues, including – but not limited to – linguistic matters,86 perceived 
constitutional competence,87 the impact of the proposed interpretation on the impugned 
legislation,88 the weight to be attached to the relevant/applicable Strasbourg jurisprudence89 
and so on.90 
Human rights adjudication has also seen the apex court repeatedly refer to Lord 
Sankey’s description of the British North American Act 1867 as a ‘living tree capable of growth 
and expansion within its natural limits.’91 In Brown v Stott, Lord Bingham, noted that, ‘[a]s an 
important constitutional instrument,’ the ECHR ‘is to be seen as a “living tree capable of 
growth and expansion within its natural limits” … but those limits will often call for very 
careful consideration.’92 While ‘living tree’ interpretation is primarily taken to address the 
                                                          
85 R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [120].  
86 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21; [2003] 2 AC 467.   
87 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467.  
88 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 AC 837. 
89 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269. 
90 For what remains the most sustained examination of these issues see: A. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review 
under the UK’s Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
91 Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada [1930] AC 124, 136.  
92 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 703.  
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capacity for understandings of constitutional instruments to develop over time, it is the ‘natural 
limits’ of evolutive interpretation that have been emphasised in subsequent decisions. 
Reference to the ‘living tree’ approach has – instead of supporting expansive interpretations of 
the Convention rights in decisions under the HRA – been used as a means of cautioning against 
an expansionist approach. As such, Lord Hope in both N v Home Secretary93 and Ambrose v 
Harris94– stressed that the ‘natural limits’ to the Convention rights were to be primarily found 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Reliance on JCPC authority was, 
again, tempered by the developing approach to the interpretation of the requirements of the 
HRA in order to reflect the HRA’s explicit linkage to a specific body of extra-territorial 
jurisprudence.95  
Both strands of Judicial Committee authority on constitutional interpretation provided 
an initial source of inspiration for the apex court’s approach to HRA adjudication, but were 
reasonably quickly jettisoned, or qualified, as a result of the emerging judicial consensus on 
the contours of legitimate s.3(1) interpretation,96 and the solidification of the Convention 
jurisprudence as the dominant (external) judicial authority on the meaning and application of 
the HRA rights.97 The former reflects both the sub-Constitutional status of the HRA and the 
tension between the judicio-centric ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional rights 
instruments and the co-operative, and statutory, nature of the HRA; the latter – though 
                                                          
93 N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 31; [2005] 2 AC 296, [22]-[25].  
94 Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1 WLR 2435, [19].  
95 Section 2(1) HRA.  
96 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557. 
97 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323. On the broader role of foreign 
jurisprudence in HRA adjudication see: R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: 
Developing a “Municipal Law of Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act (2005) 54 ICLQ 907, 921-923.  
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‘internationalist’ in its focus on giving effect to the requirements of the ECHR as expressed in 
the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court98 – reflected the HRA’s purpose of giving domestic 
effect to the pre-existing catalogue of rights contained in the ECHR.  
 
(b) Devolution: 
A devolutionary counterpart to JCPC-supported expansive readings of the HRA can be found 
in the decision of the House of Lords in Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.99 
In Robinson, Lord Bingham found that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was ‘in effect a 
constitution’ and that it followed that its provisions ‘should, consistently with the language 
used, be interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in mind the values which the 
constitutional provisions are intended to embody.’100 Similarly, Lord Hoffmann found that the 
Act should not be interpreted ‘rigidly’ and that giving effect to the broader political agreement 
it rested upon ‘required … flexibility.’101 In so finding, a majority of the Law Lords was able 
to dismiss a challenge to the validity of elections to the positions of First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister on the basis that they had fallen outside the statutory time limit apparently laid 
down by (the then) s.16 Northern Ireland Act 1998. Lord Bingham cited no authority in support 
of adopting the ‘generous and purposive’ interpretation of the Northern Ireland Act; this both 
illustrates the occasional difficulty – alluded to above and evident in broader patterns of 
                                                          
98 B. Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
ch.3. Cf. In Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, [65] (Lord Hoffmann).  
99 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32.   
100 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32.   
101 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] ULHL 32, [32]. 
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constitutional borrowing102 – of tracing the importation by the Law Lords of authorities 
articulated by their JCPC alter egos, and also suggests a degree of ubiquity to the notion that 
constitutional instruments are entitled to a expansive, rather than, textualist interpretation. Yet, 
just as in the context of HRA adjudication, the ‘generous and purposive’ approach has failed 
to embed. 
Subsequent decisions considering the interpretation of the Scotland and Government of 
Wales Acts have indicated an intermediate approach, which seeks to reconcile the distinctive, 
democratic, characteristics of the devolved bodies with their heritage as creatures of legislation. 
As such, the Scottish Parliament is judicially-regarded as being no ordinary statutory body, but 
a ‘democratically elected legislature’103 enjoying ‘plenary powers’104 subject to the limitations 
stated in the Scotland Act105 and ‘constitutional review’ on the basis of the common law 
principle of legality.106 Devolution jurisprudence post-Robinson illustrates two limitations to 
analogising the devolution legislation and written constitutions. First, as Lord Reed bluntly put 
it in the decision of the Inner House in Imperial Tobacco: ‘The Scotland Act is not a 
constitution, but an Act of Parliament.’107 Second, while the devolution Acts are regarded as 
                                                          
102 McCrudden highlights the ‘distinction between explicit and non-explicit reference to judicial decisions in other 
jurisdictions’ (C. McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499, 511).  
103 AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868, [145]. 
104 AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868, [147]. 
105 Scotland Act 1998, s.29(2).  
106 AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] 1 AC 868, [149]-[153]. 
107 Imperial Tobacco [2012] CSIH 9, [71] (emphasis added). 
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constitutional statutes at common law,108 this status ‘cannot be taken, in itself, as a guide to its 
interpretation. The statute must be interpreted like any other statute.’109   
The balance to be struck between the character of the Scottish Parliament as a 
representative assembly and its status as the direct product of Westminster statute was outlined 
by the unanimous Supreme Court in the reference on the UK Withdrawal from the European 
Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill in the following terms:  
 
The Scotland Act must be interpreted in the same way as any other statute. The courts 
have regard to its aim to achieve a constitutional settlement and therefore recognise the 
importance of giving a consistent and predictable interpretation of the Scotland Act so 
that the Scottish Parliament has a coherent, stable and workable system within which 
to exercise its legislative power. This is achieved by interpreting the rules as to 
competence in the Scotland Act according to the ordinary meaning of the words used.110  
  
As such, the courts have sought to recognise – within the frameworks provided by the 
devolution legislation – the distinctive constitutional status of the devolutionary arrangements, 
without sanctioning general departures from the legislative intent-driven techniques of 
interpretation to be applied in their application. They have done so without adopting the 
‘generous and purposive’ interpretative approach to constitutional instruments often visible in 
                                                          
108 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] QB 151, [60]-[64].  
109 Imperial Tobacco v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61; 2013 SC (UKSC) 153, [15]; Agricultural Sector (Wales) 
Bill – Reference by the Attorney General for England and Wales [2014] UKSC 43, [6].  
110 UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill [2018] UKSC 64, [12]. 
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Judicial Committee decisions. In consequence, Robinson – as Lord Reed has argued – now 
appears ‘best understood as a decision concerned with its own specific circumstances.’111 
The devolutionary context also reveals instances of Privy Council jurisprudence being 
of indirect influence on UK apex court decision-making.112 In Martin v HM Advocate – in the 
context of discussion over the boundary between ‘devolved’ and ‘non-devolved’ matters – 
Lord Hope used various ‘federal’ cases113 to outline the influence of the ‘pith and substance’114 
doctrine on the ‘background to the scheme that is now to be found in the Scotland Act.115 But 
Lord Hope went on to say that: ‘[w]hile the phrase “pith and substance” was used while [the 
provisions of the Scotland Act] were being debated, it does not appear in any of them. The idea 
had informed the statutory language, and the rules to which the courts must give effect are 
those laid down by the statute.’116 Lord Walker was both in agreement and more forthright: 
  
                                                          
111 Lord Reed, ‘Scotland’s Devolved Settlement and the Role of the Courts’, Dover House Lecture (27 February 
2019). Cf. the dissenting judgment of Lord Kerr in Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 
27, [211]-[213].  
112 Lady Hale, ‘Devolution and the Supreme Court – 20 Years On’ (Scottish Public Law Group, Edinburgh), 14 
June 2018.  
113 Including: Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v Bank of Commerce (1947) LR 74 Indian Appeals 23; Union Colliery 
Co of British Columbia Ltd v Bryden [1899] AC 580.  
114 Lady Hale, ‘Devolution and the Supreme Court – 20 Years On’ (Scottish Public Law Group, Edinburgh), 14 
June 2018. The ‘pith and substance’ doctrine holds that so long as the primary object of challenged legislation (its 
‘pith and substance’) is deemed to fall within competence, it will not be held ultra vires by virtue of incidental 
impacts on issues outwith the legislature’s competence (Union Colliery Co of British Columbia Ltd v Bryden 
[1899] AC 580, 587).  
115 Martin v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, [11]-[14].  
116 Martin v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, [15].   
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The Scotland Act is on any view a monumental piece of constitutional legislation. 
Parliament established the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive and 
undertook the challenging task of defining the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament, while itself continuing as the sovereign legislature of the United Kingdom. 
That task is different from defining the division of legislative powers between one 
federal legislature and several provincial or state legislatures (as in Canada or Australia, 
whose constitutional difficulties the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council used to 
wrestle with, often to the dissatisfaction of those dominions). The doctrine of ‘pith and 
substance’ mentioned by Lord Hope in his judgment is probably more apt to apply to 
the construction of constitutions of that type.117 
 
Both judges were keen to stress that reliance on JCPC case-law on the allocation of powers in 
a federal system could only be of limited use to the interpretation of the statutory allocation of 
powers under the Scotland Act.118  
 
Proportionality: 
A similar pattern can be observed in relation to the UK apex court’s treatment of JCPC 
authorities concerning the test for proportionality. The post-HRA introduction of 
proportionality analysis in human rights adjudication in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department119 explicitly adopted the approach to proportionality mapped by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in de Freitas.120 As Lord Steyn (again) noted in Daly:  
                                                          
117 Martin v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 10, [44].  
118 A point subsequently endorsed in Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51, [27]-[32].   
119 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
120 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69. 
For submission to P. Scott (ed.) ‘Constitutional Legacies of Empire’ Special Issue of the Northern 





The contours of the principle of proportionality are familiar. In de Freitas… the Privy 
Council adopted a three-stage test. Lord Clyde observed … that in determining whether 
a limitation (by an act, rule or decision) is arbitrary or excessive the court should ask 
itself:  
 
‘whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective 
are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.’ 
 
Given that the European Court of Human Rights had already developed an extensive 
proportionality jurisprudence,121 the adoption of a test from the JCPC is perhaps in and of itself 
an interesting development. The de Freitas test was also utilised in R v A (No.2)122 and was 
adopted by the House of Lords in the Belmarsh decision,123 but there was cited alongside a 
number of Canadian decisions including R v Oakes124 and Libman v Attorney-General of 
Quebec.125 By this point in time therefore the de Freitas definition no longer held the monopoly 
on the top court’s conception of the doctrine. Since, the influence of de Freitas in the context 
                                                          
121 For a brief summary of key cases see R. Clayton, ‘Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act 
and the Proportionality Principle’ [2001] EHRLR 504, 505-507.  
122 R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [38].   
123 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68, [30]. 
124 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.  
125 Libman v Attorney-General of Quebec (1997) 3 BHRC 269.  
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of Supreme Court decisions on proportionality has been somewhat diluted by the wealth of 
comparative authorities which have attempted to define what is argued to have become a pre-
eminent pan-jurisdictional tool of constitutionalism.126 As a result – while the Supreme Court 
continues to cite the Daly variant of the proportionality test127 – it has also relied on decisions 
from common and civil law jurisdictions128 in support of the more precise test to now be 
applied. As Lord Reed outlined in Bank Mellat:  
 
The approach to proportionality adopted in our domestic law under the Human Rights 
Act has not generally mirrored that of the Strasbourg Court. In accordance with the 
analytical approach to legal reasoning characteristic of the common law, a more clearly 
structured approach has generally been adopted, derived from case law under 
Commonwealth constitutions and Bills of Rights, including in particular the Canadian 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 1982.129  
 
                                                          
126 See for instance: D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); K. Möller, 
The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
127 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, [20]; R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; [2016] AC 1355, [133].  
128 In particular, Germany (G. Lübbe-Wolff, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the Case Law of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’ (2014) 34 HRLJ 12 is cited in both R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; [2016] AC 1355, [134] and Pham v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2015] UKSC 19, [96]). On which see: Lord Reed, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom’, Centre for Private Law, University of Edinburgh, 13 October 2017.  
129 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, [72].  
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In the same decision, Lord Sumption described de Freitas as containing ‘the classic 
formulation of the test’ for proportionality, but went on to say that ‘although [de Freitas] was 
a milestone in the development of the law’ the JCPC decision ‘is now more important for the 
way in which it has been adapted and applied in the subsequent case law.’130 Both Lords 
Sumption and Reed noted that the de Freitas test amounted to only a partial reflection of 
proportionality as it had subsequently been articulated by the House of Lords and Supreme 
Court, and that the addition of a fourth stage to the test – ‘whether, balancing the severity of 
the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of 
the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former 




The foregoing has illustrated that the wholesale adoption of constitutional reasoning from 
decisions of the JCPC has not been in evidence in the development of the UK apex court’s 
domestic constitutional jurisprudence. What has been seen is an occasional – and continuing – 
tendency to utilise specific decisions in respect of relatively discrete legal issues, ad hoc 
reference to cases illuminating common principles and a potentially diminishing series of 
trends in the utilisation of broad techniques of constitutional reasoning derived from Judicial 
Committee decisions.  
The immediate post-HRA/devolution period saw a number of judicial pronouncements 
likening the new constitutional arrangements to those obtaining in a system with a documentary 
                                                          
130 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, [20] 
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constitution. In the, now totemic, account of the principle of legality given in ex parte Simms, 
for instance, Lord Hoffmann said the following:   
 
… the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of 
Parliament, [will] apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which 
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document.131  
 
Academic commentary also advanced the thesis that the constitutional changes of the late-
1990s onwards had precipitated an abandonment of the ancien regime.132 And even the more 
modest judicial suggestion that the constitution stood at an ‘intermediate stage between 
parliamentary and constitutional supremacy’133 might suggest the need for modes of 
constitutional interpretation that recognised the increasing constitutionalisation of UK’s 
governmental order.  
But movements towards constitutionalisation should not necessarily be understood as 
a constitutional rebirth. The UK constitution remains a composite entity.134 Its components do 
not cohere as a ‘single coherent code of fundamental law which prevails over all other sources 
                                                          
131 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131-132. See also: Thoburn 
v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] QB 151, [64]; Jackson v Attorney-General [2006] 
UKHL 56, [102]. 
132 For instance: A. King, Does the United Kingdom still have a constitution? (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
2001); A. King, The British Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); V. Bogdanor, The New British 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
133 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for Transport [2003] QB 728, [71].  
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of law.’135 Nor are those components reflective of the ambitions of the drafters of a 
documentary constitution to ‘lay down an enduring scheme of government in accordance with 
certain moral and political values.’136 The bare fact of constitutional interpretation in the post-
1998 era is that is an exercise focused on the application of, and relationships between, 
components of the constitutional order, rather than an articulation of the order writ large. The 
recognition of ‘constitutional statutes’ is consistent with this, and speaks to the relationship 
between potentially conflicting statutes and other elements of the framework rather than 
mandating a wholesale approach to interpretation of legislation with a constitutional content 
and purpose.137 Even though elements of the landscape – the HRA perhaps in particular – may 
wield something close to a pervasive influence, they too remain sub-Constitutional in the sense 
that they are designed to ensure that the legislature retains the ability to legislate in 
contravention of the protections they seek to put in place.138 The doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty looms large, both as a tool of constitutional design, and also as the meta-principle 
governing interpretation and application of the order’s component parts. As Lord Rodger 
recognised in R v A (No.2) – against this backdrop – the importation of ‘Privy Council 
authorities should be treated with some caution since they are the product of constitutional 
systems which differ from that of the United Kingdom in this important respect.’139 
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In this context, the importation of modes of judicial reasoning which might prompt a 
significant departure from the statute-focused interpretative techniques with which the 
common law is familiar would therefore be problematic from at least two perspectives. First, 
the importation of techniques of constitutional interpretation from Privy Council decisions 
would be susceptible to broader critiques of constitutional borrowing, namely that it is often 
unprincipled and methodologically imprecise, is susceptible to confirmation bias, and – in its 
importation of standards developed in other systems – is undermining of democratic self-
government.140 Second, such an approach would be undermining of parliamentary sovereignty 
in the sense that it would import methods of interpretation which – rather than giving effect to 
legislative will – seek to give effect to a broader understanding of the constitutional landscape 
and its purpose which is (potentially) disassociated from the specific legislation at issue. 
Concerns in relation to transferability of separation of powers’ requirements from jurisdictions 
with documentary constitutions into the UK have on these grounds been longstanding.141 As 
Lord Reed has recognised: ‘… decisions of courts in states with a written constitution can be 
as likely to mislead as to help when it comes to analysing the boundaries of common law rules 
developed on a case by case basis over the course of British history.’142 It is for the latter reason 
in particular that the ‘radical’ approach to interpretation under the HRA and overtly ‘federal’ 
readings of the devolutionary scheme have failed to germinate in the jurisprudence of the UK’s 
apex court. It is perhaps for a related reason that the inward migration of authorities relating to 
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the meaning of proportionality may be more likely to be of ongoing significance. While 
doctrinal readings of the standard may differ as between jurisdictions, proportionality is 
nonetheless viewed as a common analytical tool with cross-jurisdictional influence.143 Equally, 
it is sufficiently disassociated from application in any specific constitution or constitutions so 
as to negate concerns relating to the importation of ideas from an inappropriate source.  
The failure of JCPC authorities to take consistent root in the UK constitution can also 
be seen to be of a piece with what Stephenson has described as the Supreme Court’s ‘renewed 
interest in autochthonous constitutionalism.’144 Stephenson has argued that the UK Supreme 
Court – in the context of disputes concerning the degrees to which external (European) human 
rights norms will permeate and influence the domestic order – has sought to assert ‘the primacy, 
relevance and sufficiency of the UK Constitution.’145 Stephenson’s thesis contends that the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the autochthonous state of UK constitutional law is reflective of 
a caution relating to the extent to which external influences might disrupt the internal, and a 
response to political pressures surrounding the domestic influence of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Brexit-driven desire to disentangle the UK’s legal order from EU 
norms.146 
An alternative thesis might position the Supreme Court’s approach in less negative 
terms, and instead emphasise the growing confidence and maturity of the independent Supreme 
Court as a constitutional organ. As that court matures, and is populated by a body of judges 
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who have worked with the UK’s own breed of constitutional jurisprudence for much of their 
professional lives, perhaps the guiding hand of the Judicial Committee jurisprudence is needed 
less than it may once have seemed. On this reading, the UK constitution remains open to 
jurisprudential influences from elsewhere, but the distinctive character of the UK’s 
devolutionary arrangements (ie their non-federal nature), and of the HRA (especially as a result 
of its clear linkage with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights) also mean that 
specific transplants from elsewhere may find it difficult to fully embed in the UKSC’s 
jurisprudence. The diminishing relevance of JCPC authorities from this perspective reflects the 
broader tendency for extra-jurisdictional authorities to be of transitional relevance.147 In the 
immediate post-1998 period JCPC authorities were relied upon as a means of articulating and 
stabilising the requirements of the UK’s new human rights and devolutionary regimes, but as 
a precursor (or pathway towards) to the development of a domestically-engineered 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
Lord Bingham has argued that the JCPC’s constitutional and bills of rights 
jurisprudence has two faces, ‘one traditional or conservative, the other broader and more 
internationalist in outlook.’148 It is arguably the case that the constitutional jurisprudence of the 
UK Supreme Court is developing along similar lines, maintaining a necessary focus on the 
distinctive statutory framework of the UK constitution, while remaining – as per the common 
law tradition – receptive to, though generally not driven by, extra-jurisdictional influences.  
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